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NOTE AND COMMENT.
INTERSTATE COMERCE AND STATE CONTROL OVER FORIoN CORPORATIONS.-
Since Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 13 Pet. 519, there seems to have been no
real'occasion to doubt the power of a state totally to exclude foreign cor-
porations seeking to engage in intrastate business only. The power to ex-
clude being absolute, there has been no question as to the right of the state
to allow the entrance of the -foreign corporation for such business upon
terms, and the terms may be of any sort, reasonable or unreasonable, except
that the corporation seeking to enter cannot as a condition precedent to such
entry be required to -surrender a right or privilege conferred upon it 'by the
federal constitution or statutes. For example, a condition that no case
should be removed by the corporation to. the 'federal courts was declared
invalid, and the corporation was allowed -to remove cases despite the condi-
tion. Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 2o Wall. 445. But 'for breach of such con-
dition a state was allowed to revoke the, permit to engage in domestic busi-
ness within its borders. Doyle v. Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535; Security Mut.
L. I. Co. v. Prezvitt, 202 U. S. 246. 'The terms of admission very often are in
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the nature of requirements for the payment of a license fee, an excise for
the privilege of engaging in business within the state, and such license fees
may be of any amount, and measured -by any standard, the questions of reas-
onableness and discrimination not being involved. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
McMaster, 84 S. C. 495, 66 S. E. 877.
It must be considered as equally well settled that a state cannot refuse
to allow a foreign corporation engaged in interstate commerce to come with-
in its borders, nor may it impose terms or conditions upon suoh corporations.
International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S. 91, 30 Sup. Ct. 481, 54 L. Ed.
678, 24 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493.
Where a corporation seeks to enter a state for the purpose of doing both
interstate and intrastate business the situation becomes somewhat more com-
plex. Until a comparatively recent time it has been considered that the fact
that a foreign corporation was to engage in interstate commerce along with its
intrastate business did not prevent the state from imposing -terms upon the
right to engage in the latter or even to prohibit the same entirely; in other
words, that there was no absolute right in a foreign corporation to engage in
domestic business even though at the same time it was engaged, perhaps with
the same instrumentalities,- in carrying on interstate commerce. Western Un-
ion Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 132 U. S. 472; Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Charleston, 153
U. S. 692; Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 42o; Allen v. Pullman Pal. Car
Co., 191 U. S. 171; Kehrer v. Stewart, 197 U. S. 6o. These cases clearly estab-
lish the proposition that foreign corporations engaged in interstate commerce
may be taxed in respect of their privilege of carrying on domestic or intra-
state business, and the power to lay such tax would, it seems, carry with it
the power to prohibit.
In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 U. S. I, 30 'Sup. Ct. 199, 54 L.
Ed. 355, and Pullman Co. v. Kansas, 216 'U. S. 56, 30 Sup. Ct. 232, 54 L. Ed.
378, the court had under consideration a Kansas statute 'hich required a
foreign corporation to -pay a fee of one-tenth of one per cent on the first
one hundred thousand dollars of its authorized capital stock, one twentieth of
one per cent on the next four hundred thousand dollars, and for each million
or major part thereof, two hundred dollars. The court declared the statute
unconstitutional as violative of the fourteenth amendment and as burdening
interstate commerce, the fee being considered as a tax upon the interstate
business as well as the domestic business. Mr. Justic HARLAN in the West-
ern Union Case said: "It is true that in many cases the general rule has been
laid down that a State may, if it chooses to do so, exclude foreign corpora-
tions from its limits, or impose such terms and conditions on their doing
business in the State as in its judgment may be consistent with the interests
of the people. But those were cases in which the foreign corporation before
the court was engaged in ordinary business and not directly or regularly in
interstate or foreign commerce." The cases hereinbefore referred to declared
that a foreign corporation engaged primarily in interstate commerce could be
subjected to a tax upon the privilege of doing domestic business, and the
result of the Kansas cases would seem to be that while not denying entirely
the right of the state to lay such privilege tax, in the case of corporations
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engaged directly or regularly in interstate commerce the tax must not be of
such character as to burden even indirectly the company's interstate business.
In those cases the tax measured as the statute directed was deemed to be a
burden upon interstate commerce. See also to the same effect, Ludwig v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 216 U. S. 146; Atchison, etc. R. Co. v. O'Connor,
223 U. S. 28o.
Two years after the decision. of the Kansas cases the supreme court of
California had occasion to pass upon the validity of a provision of the law
of that state requiring foreign corporations to pay a "license tax" graduated in
amount and measured by the total capital stock of the corporation. The
provision was very much like the Kansas statute involved in the Kansas
litigation. In the California case the validity of the law was attacked by a
corporation organized in. Pennsylvania and engaged in the business of manu-
facturing and selling tablets, pills, etc., some of its business being interstate
and some intrastate. It was held, on the authority of the Kansas cases, that
the tax was unconstitutional. H. K. Mulford Co. v. Curry, 163 'Cal. 276, 125
Pac. 236. The principle of the Kansas cases was declared, to be as follows:
"The admitted power of the state to regulate and prescribe terms under
which a foreign corporation may engage in intrastate or domestic business is
subject to this limitation, that where such foreign corporation is engaged in
interstate, as well as intrastate business, no such term, condition or requirement
will be constitutional if it imposes any burden upon the interstate business of
such corporation, whatever be its name or -form. 'A license or privilege tax,
for the conduct of such intrastate 'business, based upon the total capital or
the total capital stock of such corporation, without just relation to the propor-
tion which the capital or capital stock used in the state bears to the whole
capital or capital stock, though in terms declared to be directed solely to the
intrastate 'business of such corporation, is unconstitutional and. void, (a) as be-
ing in violation of the commerce clause of the constitution 'by the iniposition
of an illegal burden upon interstate commerce, and (b) because violative of
the fourteenth amendment of the constitution and its equal protection and
due process of law clause, as an effort to tax the property of citizens of the
United States, which property is situated 'beyond the jurisdiction of the
-taxing state and is not amenable to its revenue laws." Admittedly for the
guidance of the legislature the court then proceeds to state its opinion as to
the effect of the Kansas cases, and concludes: "It is but -the indulgence of
futile and unwarranted' speculation to say that the Supreme Court of the
United States would call in the fourteenth amendment to the aid of a for-
eign corporation doing an interstate business to overthrow a. state tax 'law
and would not invoke it in the case of a foreign corporation engaged in
purely domestic business, notwithstanding that the tax upon the capital stocks
of the foreign corporations (end thus the tax upon the property without the
jurisdiction of the state) was in both instances identically -the same. Nor
can relief be -found in a refusal to call such a license-fee a tax. A state court
may call it a fee or an exaction or a regulation, but the 'Supreme Court of
the United States will call it a tax if in its effect it partake of the nature of
a tax."
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That the California court 'was wrong in the statement last quoted and in
its conclusion in the case -before it is shown by the very recent cases of Baltic
Mining Co. v. Massachusetts and S. S. White Dental Mfg. Co. v. Massachu-
setts, reported together with one opinion. in 34 Sup. Ct. 15. 'In those cases
the court considered the validity of a provision of the Massachusetts statutes
providing that "Every foreign corporation shall, in each year, At the time of
filing its annual certificate of condition, pay to the treasurer and Teceiver-
general, for the use of the commonwealth, an excise tax, of one-fiftieth of
one per cent of the par value of its authorized capital stock as stated in its
annual certificate of condition; but the amount of such excise tax shall not in
any one year exceed the sum of $2,ooo." The complaining corporations were
organized in Michigan and Pennsylvania, and were engaged, the one in the
business of mining and disposing of copper, and the other in the manufac-.
ture and sale of dental supplies; both 'ad offices in Boston, and sold their
products for delivery in ,Massachusetts and also outside the state, but only
a relatively small portion of their property was in that state. It was held. that
the statufe was valid; the Kansas cases were distinguished on the ground,
that in the present cases the "local and domestic business, for -the privilege
of doing which the state -has imposed a tax, is real and substantial, and not
so connected with interstate commerce as -to render a tax upon it a 'burden
upon the interstate business of 'the companies involved," that the capital
stock was used simply as a means of measuring the license -fee; while in
the earlier cases the business of-the complaining companies "was commerce,
the same instrumentalities and the same agencies carrying on, in the same
places the business of the companies of state and interstate character," there
being "no attempt to separate the intrastate business from the interstate bus-
iness by the limitations of state lines in its prosecution," and, the real nature
of the tax, under the facts, was to burden interstate commerce and to reach
property represented by the capital stock of the companies, which 'was duly
paid in and invested in property in many states, and -therefore beyond the
taxing jurisdiction of Kansas.
In two cases decided -within the last year the Supreme -Court of the
United States has declared that despite the Kansas cases it is within 'state
power to exact a license fee of a foreign corporation. for the privilege of
engaging-in domestic business, and in both of those c6ses the complaining
companies ,were engaged primarily in interstate commerce and were organized
for the purpose of carrying on commerce. Williants v. Talladega, 226 U. S.
404, 33 Sup. Ct. 118; Ewing v. Leavenworth, 226 U. S. 464, 33 Sup. Ct. 157.
In the Williams case it was really the Western Union Telegraph Company
that complained of a conviction of its agent Williams for having carried on
domestic telegraph business in Alabama without having paid a license -fee
imposed by an ordinance of the City of Talladega. It appeared -from the evi-
dence that the domestic business of the company at Talladega for eleven
months of the year I9o8, the last quarter's license of which Williams /had
refused to pay, was conducted at a net loss of eighty-six cents. The follow-
ing language of the Supreme 'Court is deeply significant: "It is contended that
the result of. the tax upon the intrastate 'business conducted at a 'loss is to
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impose a burden upon the other business of the company and is therefore
void. The Supreme Court of Alabama, however, reached the conclusion that
the attempted test for eleven months, showing a loss of eighty-six cents, is
not a sufficiently accurate representation of the business of the company con-
ducted at Talladega to render the tax void. *With -this view we agree, and
we are not satisfied that the tax is such, as to impose a 'burden upon- interstate
cormerce, and therefore make it subject to attack as a -denial of Federal
right."
A careful examination of the cases seems to establish that the law as to
the matter herein considered has undergone a process of development and
definition. From the cases decided prior to the Kansas cases the conclusion
was inevitable that a state had the -power to tax a foreign corporation for
the privilege of engaging in domestic business, even though such corpora-
tion was at the same time engaged in interstate commerce and even though
the business of the corporation was in a strict 'sense commerce, and that -the
power to -tax such privilege, carried to its logical extent, meant also .the power
to prohibit such business. The corporation 'had its choice, either to pay the
tax and-abide by -the terms and conditions imposed-subject to the limitations
before pointed out, or to give up its domestic business. The Kansas cases
declared that if the tax upon -the privilege of doing intrastate business is
measured -by the 'total capital stock of the corporation and the corporation is
one engaged directly and wholly in commerce, i. e. transportation then 'the
tax is in reality a burden upon interstate commerce and void as such. In
the Massachusetts cases, however, -the court now 'holds that a tax upon the
privilege of doing domestic -business' measured on the basis of a percentage
of the entire capital stock of a foreign corporation engaged in both interstate
and domestic business, but which is not engaged in transportation itself, is a
valid tax. It is believed that there is no sound distinction between the tvo
groups of cases on the ground suggested. Interstate commerce which is pro-
tected by the federal constitution from state interference is not limited to
transportation, The interstate business of a corporation engaged in man-
ufacturing and selling its products should be as much protected -from state
interference and annoyance as the interstate business of a corporation engaged
in transportation. The reason for guarding interstate commerce Irom state
control is believed to be found not in any desire to extend any special indul-
gence to the persons engaged in such business, but for 'the protection of the
interstate business. There may be a difference between the interstate business
that is transportation and the interstate business that is not transportation
in that state interference may 'be -more immediately and directly felt by the
public when the state action affects corporations engaged in the first, but it
cannot 'be contended that the difference is other than of degree. It is submit-
ted that the court's ground of distinction between the ,two groups of cases
is not legally sound, that if the Kansas cases were correctly decided the
Massachusetts cases are incorrect, or vice-versa. It is perhaps too late to pro-
test against the conclusion in the Kansas cases, the court though divided
five to four at the time the Westefit Union case was decided has since unan-
imously applied the rule of the case in later litigation involving the same
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question. See Atchison, etc. R. C. v. O'Connor, supra. It is believed that
the decision in those cases was erroneous, and that the correct doctrine is
that laid down in the Massachusetts cases. However, the court hias com-
mitted itself to the recognition of the two classes of cases.
The cases of TVilliams v. Talladega and Ewing v. Leavenworth, above re-
ferxed to, show clearly that the court does not consider the Kansas cases as
denying to the states the right to exact a tax upon the privilege of -doing intra-
state business even in the case of a corporation engaged primarily in interstate
commerce in the way of transportation. Such tax, however, must be of such a
character and of such an amount as not to be a burden upon the corporation's
interstate commerce, and the intimation is strong in Williams v. Talladega
that it is proper and important to inquire into the profits from the domestic
business with a view to determining whether or not the tax imposed can
be paid out of such profits. R. W. A.
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